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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Most patent prosecutors would probably agree that it is our professional 
responsibility to obtain the broadest possible claims for our clients.  This professional 
responsibility is often taken to mean obtaining the broadest claims possible in light of 
prior art.  As a result, practitioners may well draft broad generic claims based on a limited 
number of working examples or species.  In some instances, the generic claims may be so 
broad that they encompass millions or even billions of compounds or species. 
¶2 The temptation to claim broadly is not new.  For example, Samuel Morse, the 
inventor of the telegraph, claimed not just the telegraph, but all means of communicating 
electronically at a distance.1  Similarly in the chemical arts, an inventor of a new 
chemical compound often attempts to claim not only the new compound, but also the 
entire genus to which the new compound belongs.  In some cases, a generic claim 
encompassing millions of compounds is based on the discovery of only one or two 
species.  But what is wrong with aggressively broad generic claims?  Isn't an applicant 
entitled to claim as broadly as permitted by the prior art?  Not exactly.  In addition to 
being bound by the requirements that an invention be useful, novel, and non-obvious in 
light of prior art, patent law requires that a claim be fully enabled.2  Applied to a genus 
type claim, which often includes multiple embodiments within the claimed genus, this 
means that the full scope of a generic claim must be enabled such that the scope of 
enablement bears a reasonable correlation to the breadth of the claimed genus.3  Is it 
possible for one or two species to enable an entire genus?  The answer is: perhaps.  This 
article explains some of the pitfalls of aggressively broad generic claims and possible 
ways to avoid them. 
 
* Partner, Jones Day.  The author would like to acknowledge with thanks the contributions of Justin 
Constant, a J.D. candidate at The University of Texas School of Law and a summer associate at Jones Day.  
The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Jones 
Day and any of its current and future clients. 
1 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854) (holding that Morse’s claim, which was directed to all 
communication made electronically at a distance, was invalid because it was too broad). 
2 In addition, a valid claim must meet the other requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, including the 
written description and best mode requirements.  While most foreign countries do not have the best mode 
requirement, they do have an enablement requirement.  The enablement requirement in some countries is 
more exacting than the U.S. standard discussed herein. 
3 See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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II. A JOURNEY INTO HISTORY—THE INCANDESCENT LAMP PATENT 
¶3 Before we delve into recent case law on enablement of generic claims, it is 
instructive to revisit history and examine what the U.S. Supreme Court did when faced 
with an aggressively broad generic claim in Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. 
McKeesport Light Co.   Perhaps we will learn something from history. 4
¶4 In the late 1800s, Sawyer and Man discovered the use of carbonized paper in 
incandescent lamps.  They obtained a patent entitled “Electric Light” on May 12, 1885.5  
The following picture illustrates the Sawyer and Man lamp disclosed in the patent. 
 
¶5 The patent includes the following four claims: 
1. An incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, of carbonized fibrous or 
textile material, and of an arch or horseshoe shape, substantially as hereinbefore 
set forth. 
2. The combination, substantially as hereinbefore set forth, of an electric 
circuit and an incandescing conductor of carbonized fibrous material, included 
in and forming part of said circuit, and a transparent, hermetically sealed 
chamber, in which the conductor is enclosed. 
3. The incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, formed of carbonized 
paper, substantially as described. 
4. An incandescing electric lamp consists of the following elements in 
combination: First, an illuminating chamber made wholly of glass hermetically 
sealed, and out of which all carbon-consuming gas has been exhausted or driven; 
second, an electric-circuit conductor passing through the glass wall of said 
chamber, and hermetically sealed therein, as described; third, an illuminating 
conductor in said circuit, and forming part thereof within said chamber, 
consisting of carbon made from a fibrous or textile material, having the form of 
an arch or loop, substantially as described, for the purpose specified.6
¶6 The lamps made according to the patent did not embody the principle of high 
resistance with a small illuminating surface; they did not have the filament burner of the 
modern incandescent lamp.  Moreover, the lamp chamber was defective.  Therefore, the 
lamp was never a commercial success. 
¶7 On the other hand, Thomas Edison discovered that a particular part of the stem of 
bamboo was highly useful as a conductor in incandescent lamps.  Thomas Edison also 
 
4 159 U.S. 465 (1895).  This case is also known as “The Incandescent Lamp Patent” case.  Surprisingly, 
this case has not been cited by the Federal Circuit in any of its opinions thus far. 
5 U.S. Patent No. 317,676 (filed Jan. 9, 1880) (issued May 12, 1885). 
6 Id. (emphasis added). 
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obtained a patent for his invention.7  The commercial Edison lamp was composed of a 
burner made of carbonized bamboo of a particular quality. 
¶8 The owner of the Sawyer and Man patent filed a patent infringement suit against 
the manufacturer of the Edison lamp.  The Supreme Court was called upon to decide 
whether the Edison lamp infringed the Sawyer and Man patent. 
¶9 The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the patentee was entitled to a 
monopoly of all fibrous and textile materials for incandescent conductors when the 
inventors’ discovery was limited to the use of carbonized paper.  In concluding that the 
patentee was not entitled to such a far-reaching monopoly, the Supreme Court made the 
following statements: 
If the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile substances a quality 
common to them all, or to them generally, as distinguishing them from other 
materials, such as minerals, etc., and such quality or characteristic adapted them 
peculiarly to incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad. . . .  
Sawyer and Man supposed they had discovered in carbonized paper the best 
material for an incandescent conductor.  Instead of confining themselves to 
carbonized paper, as they might properly have done, and in fact did in their third 
claim, they made a broad claim for every fibrous or textile material, when in fact 
an examination of over 6,000 vegetable growths showed that none of them 
possessed the peculiar qualities that fitted them for that purpose.  Was everybody, 
then, precluded by this broad claim from making further investigation?  We think 
not.8
¶10 The Supreme Court sensed the injustice of holding otherwise because it was 
impressed by the evidence that showed that Thomas Edison and his assistants conducted 
numerous experiments, for several months, among the different species of vegetable 
growth, for the purpose of ascertaining the one best adapted to an incandescent 
conductor.  Of these he found suitable for his purpose only about three species of 
bamboo, one species of cane from the valley of the Amazon, and one or two species of 
fibers from the agave family.  Of the special bamboo, the walls of which had a thickness 
of about 3/8 of an inch, he used only about 20/1000 of an inch in thickness.  In this 
portion of the bamboo, the fibers were almost parallel, the cell walls were relatively 
small, and the pithy matter between the fibers was relatively minimal.  It appeared that 
carbon filaments could not be made of wood (i.e., exogenous vegetable growth) because 
the fibers were not parallel and the longitudinal fibers were intercepted by radial fibers.  
The wood-fiber cells were all so large that the resulting carbon was very porous and 
friable.  Lamps made of this material proved to be of no commercial value.  After trying 
as many as thirty or forty different woods of exogenous growth, he gave them up as 
hopeless.  But finally, while experimenting with a bamboo strip which formed the edge of 
a palm-leaf fan, cut into filaments, he obtained surprising results.  After microscopic 
examination of the material, he dispatched a man to Japan to make arrangements for 
securing the bamboo for further testing.  9
 
7 U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 1, 1879) (issued Jan. 27, 1880). 
8 Consol. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added). 
9 Id. at 472–73. 
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¶11 The messenger whom Thomas Edison dispatched to different parts of Japan and 
China sent him about forty different kinds of bamboo, in such quantities as to enable him 
to make a number of lamps, and from a test of these different species he ascertained 
which was best for the purpose.  From this it appeared very clearly that there was no 
quality common to fibrous and textile substances generally as to make them suitable for 
an incandescent conductor.  Instead, the bamboo that worked best was not selected 
because it fit the general criteria of fibrous material, but because it contained specific 
peculiarities in its fibrous structure which distinguished it from every other fibrous 
substance.  10
¶12 At the time, Rev. Stat. § 4888, the predecessor of 35 U.S.C. § 112, was the relevant 
patent statute and read as follows: 
Before any inventor or discoverer shall receive a patent for his invention or 
discovery he shall make application therefor, in writing to the Commissioner of 
Patents, and shall file in the Patent Office a written description of the same and of 
the manner and process of making, constructing, compounding and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make, construct, compound, and use the same.11
¶13 In analyzing the facts of the case and applying the above statute and its own 
precedent, the Supreme Court asked a rhetorical question: “[H]ow would it be possible 
for a person to know what fibrous or textile material was adapted to the purpose of an 
incandescent conductor except by the most careful and painstaking experimentation?”12  
Then the Court remarked further: 
If, as before observed, there were some general quality, running through the 
whole fibrous and textile kingdom, which distinguished it from every other, 
and gave it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose, the man who 
discovered such quality might justly be entitled to a patent; but that is not the 
case here.  An examination of materials of this class carried on for months 
revealed nothing that seemed to be adapted to the purpose; and even the 
carbonized paper and wood carbons specified in the patent, experiments 
with which first suggested their incorporation therein, were found to be so 
inferior to the bamboo, afterwards discovered by Edison, that the 
complainant was forced to abandon its patent in that particular, and take up 
with the material discovered by its rival.  Under these circumstances, to hold 
that one who had discovered that a certain fibrous or textile material answered 
the required purpose should obtain the right to exclude everybody from the whole 
domain of fibrous and textile materials, and thereby shut out any further efforts to 
discover a better specimen of that class than the patentee had employed, would 
be an unwarranted extension of his monopoly, and operate rather to discourage 
than to promote invention.  If Sawyer and Man had discovered that a certain 
carbonized paper would answer the purpose, their claim to all carbonized 
 
10 Id. at 474. 
11 Rev. Stat. § 4888, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 201 (1870) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)) 
(emphasis added). 
12 Consol. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 475. 
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paper would, perhaps, not be extravagant; but the fact that paper happens 
to belong to the fibrous kingdom did not invest them with sovereignty over 
this entire kingdom, and thereby practically limit other experimenters to the 
domain of minerals.13
Based on the above reasoning, the Supreme Court held that claims 1, 2, and 4 of the 
Sawyer and Man patent were invalid.14  Because it was admitted that claim 3 was not 
infringed, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the bill. 
III. THE LEGAL STANDARD—“UNDUE EXPERIMENTATION” AND THE WANDS FACTORS 
¶14 Now fast forward to the modern day era, where we find the enablement 
requirement, inter alia, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .15
¶15 The Federal Circuit applies the enablement requirement by asking whether one of 
skill in the art could make and use the invention, without undue experimentation, from 
the disclosure in the patent specification, coupled with information known in the art at the 
time the patent application was filed.16  In other words, does the specification contain 
sufficient detail to enable others skilled in the art to practice the claimed invention 
without “undue experimentation?”  17
¶16 Moreover, the specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice 
“the full scope of the claimed invention.”18  One-to-one correlation is not required—the 
law does not require that 
the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every 
possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan’s knowledge of the prior 
art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between 
embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, 
depending upon the predictability of the art.19
 
13 Id. at 475–76 (emphasis added). 
14 The Court stated that claim 1 and its dependent claims were “too indefinite to be the subject of a valid 
monopoly.” Id. at 479.  While this phraseology appears to suggest that the claims were held invalid for 
being indefinite, the Court’s rationale seems to be premised on lack of enablement. Id.  However, the Court 
did not make reference to the word “enablement” anywhere in the opinion even though the patent statute 
had an enablement requirement. 
15 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
16 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Atlas Powder Co. 
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
17 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  See also In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 
(C.C.P.A. 1976). 
18 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Wright, 999 F.2d 
1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
19 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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All the law requires is that the “enabling disclosure of the specification be commensurate 
in scope with the claim under consideration.”20
¶17 In determining what constitutes “undue experimentation,” the Federal Circuit 
emphasizes that the test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of 
experimentation is permissible if it is merely routine or if the specification in question 
provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which 
experimentation should proceed.21  Factors that may be considered in such evaluation 
include, but are not limited to: 
(1)  The breadth of the claims; 
(2)  The nature of the invention; 
(3)  The state of the prior art; 
(4)  The level of one of ordinary skill; 
(5)  The level of predictability in the art; 
(6)  The amount of direction provided by the inventor; 
(7)  The existence of working examples; and 
(8)  The quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention 
based on the content of the disclosure.22
The above factors, known as the eight “Wands factors,” are, however, merely illustrative, 
not mandatory.  What is relevant to any particular “undue experimentation” analysis 
depends on the specific facts.  Moreover, a court need not review all of the Wands factors 
before making an enablement determination.23
A. Predictability and Scope of Enablement 
¶18 While the courts do not point to any single Wands factor as dispositive, the case 
law suggests that the “level of predictability in the art” factor plays a significant role in 
virtually all enablement analyses.  In addition, any enablement inquiry must necessarily 
take into account the “breadth of the claims” since it is scope of the claims that sets the 
bounds for any enablement inquiry.24  These two factors—“level of predictability in the 
art” and “breadth of the claims”—are inversely related.  As noted by the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA),  the scope of the required enablement varies 25
 
20 In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  A related yet different issue arises when a generic 
claim is rejected for obviousness and the applicant tries to show unexpected results obtained from a few 
species to traverse the rejection.  It has been well established that the applicant’s showing of unexpected 
results must be commensurate in scope with the claimed range. In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2003).  See also In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Establishing that one (or a small 
number of) species gives unexpected results is inadequate proof, for ‘it is the view of this court that 
objective evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims which the evidence 
is offered to support.’” (quoting In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1971))).  Therefore, it is a double 
whammy for aggressively broad generic claims (which are supported only by a few species). 
21 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
22 Id. (emphasis added). 
23 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
24 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (the first paragraph of § 112 requires that 
the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided). 
25 As the Federal Circuit announced in its first decision, the Federal Circuit is bound by the holdings of 
its predecessor courts, the CCPA and the Court of Claims. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 
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inversely with the degree of predictability involved.26  The CCPA is careful to note 
though, that even in the unpredictable arts, a disclosure of every operable species is not 
required.  27
¶19 In cases involving predictable factors such as mechanical or electrical elements, a 
single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other 
embodiments may be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics may 
be predicted by reliance on known scientific laws.  28
¶20 On the other hand, in applications directed to inventions in arts where the results 
are unpredictable, the disclosure of a single species usually does not provide an adequate 
basis to support generic claims.29  In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most 
chemical reactions and physiological activity, more guidance may be required.  30
¶21 In unpredictable art areas, the Federal Circuit, like the CCPA, has refused to find 
broad generic claims enabled by specifications that demonstrate only one or a few 
embodiments and do not demonstrate with reasonable specificity how to make and use 
other embodiments within the full scope of the claim.31  This is because it is not obvious 
from the disclosure of one species what other species will work. 
B. A Single Embodiment May Enable Broad Claims in Predictable Arts 
¶22 In re Vickers32 is one example where the disclosure of a single embodiment enabled 
a broad generic claim in a predictable art, such as certain mechanical arts, if variations 
from the disclosed embodiment are known or obvious to one of skill in the art.  There, the 
CCPA reversed a rejection of a generic claim directed to an oil well pumping apparatus.  
Claim 4 is the generic claim and reads as follows. 
4. In combination, a cylinder for containing an operating liquid, a reciprocal 
member in said cylinder, means acting on said member for resisting the entrance 
of liquid to said cylinder, a motor cylinder, a reciprocal member in said motor 
cylinder adapted to be operably connected to the sucker rod of a pump in a well, 
a pressure forming means, a pilot operated shiftable means adapted to control the 
direction liquid under pressure through said pressure forming means and to and 
from said cylinders, a supply of operating liquid, unidirectional valve means 
connecting said supply with the inlet of said pressure forming means, valve 
means responsive to movement of one of said reciprocal members for directing 
pressure to said pilot operated means to shift the same, and additional valve 
means responsive to abnormal movement of one of said reciprocal members 
resulting in closure of the outlet port of one of said cylinder means, and thereby 
 
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (adopting decisions of the CCPA and the Court of Claims “announced before the 
close of business on September 30, 1982”). 
26 See In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 526–27 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 
1971). 
27 See In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522; In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730. 
28 See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839. 
29 See In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1938). 
30 See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839 (contrasting mechanical and electrical elements with chemical 
reactions and physiological activity). 
31 PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  See also In re Wright, 999 F.2d 
1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
32 In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522. 
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cause a replenishing of liquid from said supply to said system during said 
33delay.
¶23 The claimed oil well pumping apparatus includes a well operating or work cylinder 
and piston, an accumulator cylinder and piston, and a pump which forces liquid from one 
cylinder to the other under the control of a directional valve.34  The apparatus also 
includes two pilot valves.  One valve is controlled by the accumulator piston and causes 
normal reversal shifting of the directional valve, and the other valve is controlled by 
abnormal movement of the work cylinder piston which closes a port on the lower part of 
the work cylinder, and delays normal reversal for replenishment purposes.  35
¶24 The highlighted language of claim 4 calls broadly for the operation of the valves 
either by a single piston or by two pistons.36  However, the construction of the apparatus 
shown in the specification requires two cylinders, the piston in one operating valve means 
and the piston in the other operating the other valve means.37  Therefore, the Examiner 
rejected claim 4 for being too broad because the applicant did not disclose each specific 
embodiment of the claimed invention.  38
¶25 The CCPA reiterated the rule that ordinarily in a mechanical case, broad claims 
may be supported by a disclosure of a single form of the apparatus and that in such cases, 
an applicant may generally draw a broad claim on a single construction.  Accordingly, the 
CCPA reversed the rejection.  39
¶26 There was no discussion of the predictability in the art.  Rather, the court discussed 
the obviousness of the variations from the disclosed embodiments.40  Where there is 
predictability, variations within a genus are likely known or obvious to one skilled in the 
art. 
C. A Single Embodiment May Not Enable Broad Claims in Unpredictable Arts 
¶27 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.41 exemplifies the Federal Circuit’s strict 
application of the enablement requirement to broadly drawn biotechnology claims.  
Among the issues on appeal was the enablement of a generic claim, claim 7 of U.S. 
Patent No. 4,703,008, directed to erythropoietin (EPO) analogs, and more specifically to 
“all possible DNA sequences that will encode any polypeptide having an amino acid 
sequence ‘sufficiently duplicative’ of EPO to possess the property of increasing 
production of red blood cells.”  42
¶28 In upholding the district court’s finding of non-enablement, the Federal Circuit 
took particular note of the following facts, each of which corresponds roughly to the 
breadth and predictability factors discussed supra.  First, the court noted that claim 7 is 
 




37 Id. at 524. 
38 Id. at 526. 
39 Id. at 526–27. 
40 Id. at 524–25. 
41 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
42 Id. at 1212. 
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extremely broad.  According to the district court’s findings, “over 3,600 different EPO 
analogs can be made by substituting at only a single amino acid position, and over a 
million different analogs can be made by substituting three amino acids.”43  Each of these 
potential modifications in turn creates “manifold possibilities for change” in the EPO 
structure.44  Such “manifold possibilities” leads to the second finding, namely, that the art 
is unpredictable.  This conclusion was supported by the finding that even after five years 
of experimentation, “Amgen [was] still unable to specify which analogs have the 
biological properties set forth in claim 7.”  45
¶29 In sum, the Federal Circuit found that in light of the “structural complexity of the 
EPO gene, the manifold possibilities for change in its structure, with attendant 
uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed by these analogs” claim 7 was not 
enabled.46  In general terms then, the court articulated what is not sufficient to meet the 
standard for enabling a genus of genetic sequences: “It is not sufficient, having made the 
gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained, to claim all 
possible genetic sequences that have [the claimed] activity.”  47
¶30 Two years later, in In re Wright, a patent applicant encountered a similar problem 
when trying to patent a process for making and using vaccines.48  There, the applicant 
appealed to the Federal Circuit from a final Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejection 
of claims covering a process to make vaccines against RNA viruses, including RNA 
viruses such as HIV.  The specification, however, contained only one working example 
that described the production of immunity in chickens against one particular avian 
sarcoma RNA tumor virus.  In upholding the district court’s conclusion that the broad 
generic claims were not enabled by the specification, the Federal Circuit noted with 
approval the Examiner’s observation that the art at hand is extremely unpredictable: 
“RNA viruses are a very diverse and genetically complex group of viruses which include, 
among others, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) viruses, leukemia viruses, 
and sarcoma viruses.”  49
¶31 In addition to broad RNA virus vaccine claims, the applicant had also crafted a 
subgenus claim limited to avian RNA viruses.50  In light of the particularly narrow 
teaching of the specification, and the limited knowledge in the art, these claims suffered 
the same fate as the broad genus claims.  In essence, the court concluded that, as of 
February 1983, the filing date of the subject application, a skilled scientist reading the 
specification would not have reasonably believed that Wright’s success with one 
particular strain of avian RNA virus could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation 
of success to other avian RNA viruses.  51
¶32 Similarly, in In re Vaeck,52 the claims were broadly drawn to methods of 
genetically engineering all types of cyanobacterium hosts to produce certain protein-
 
43 Id. at 1213. 
44 Id. at 1214. 
45 Id. at 1213. 
46 Id. at 1214. 
47 Id. 
48 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
49 Id. at 1560. 
50 Id. at 1564. 
51 Id. 
52 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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based insecticides.53  The specification described general techniques for such genetic 
transformation and explicitly referred to nine genera of cyanobacteria which are useful as 
hosts.   Two of these nine specific genera were Synechocystis and Anacystis.54 55  The 
relevant working examples were further limited in that they only demonstrated the use of 
a single strain of cyanobacteria, Synechocystis 6803.  56
¶33 In upholding the enablement rejection of the claims directed to methods of 
engineering any cyanobacteria, the Vaeck panel focused on the Examiner’s statements 
regarding claim breadth57 and the unpredictability in the art given the limited knowledge 
in the art.  58
¶34 Interestingly, the Vaeck application also contained a set of sub-genus claims.  
These narrower claims were directed to two genera, Synechocystis and Anacystis, of the 
nine genera explicitly mentioned in the specification.  In finding these sub-genus claims 
enabled, the Federal Circuit noted that “the PTO did not separately address these claims, 
or indicate why they should be treated in the same manner as the claims encompassing all 
types of cyanobacteria.”  59
¶35 In re Goodman60 is yet another instructive example.  Goodman involved an appeal 
from a rejection of claims due to lack of enablement because the claims were broadly 
drawn to a method of producing mammalian peptides in any plant cell.  The Federal 
Circuit sustained the Board’s rejection, reasoning that the specification only “contains a 
single example of producing gamma-interferon in a dicotyledonous species, tobacco.”61  
The court further noted that the specification failed to address the extensive problems 
encountered by one attempting to apply the described methods to any type of plant other 
than a tobacco plant, or to any non-dicotyledonous plant.62  The court found it significant 
that in 1985, the effective filing date of the application, even the inventor’s publications 
described a “major block” to methods of transforming monocot plants, a sentiment 
mirrored by other publications which described the state of the art with regard to 
transforming monocots as “fraught with unpredictability.”  63
D. Nascent Technology Must Be Enabled with “Specific and Useful Teaching” 
¶36 In Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,64 the Federal Circuit unambiguously declared 
that technology which is still nascent at the time of filing must be enabled with a specific 
and useful teaching.  The court reasoned that such particularity is necessary since a 
person of ordinary skill in the art “has little or no knowledge independent from the 
 
53 Id. at 489. 
54 Id. at 490. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 493 (“[T]he cyanobacteria comprise a large and diverse group . . . in some 150 different 
genera.”). 
58 Id. (“The molecular biology of these organisms has only recently become the subject of intensive 
investigation and this work is limited to a few genera.”). 
59 Id. at 496. 
60 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
61 Id. at 1050. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1052. 
64 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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patentee’s instruction.”65  The Chiron panel held invalid as non-enabled claims directed 
to chimeric antibodies in view of a record that showed that (1) making chimeric 
antibodies was not routine technology at the relevant dates; and (2) an absence of any 
showing that any Chiron scientist “actually knew of chimeric antibodies” before the 
relevant date.66  Similarly, the Federal Circuit has previously declared that pioneer 
inventions are not entitled to a lower enablement standard.  67
IV. RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENT 
¶37 Several recent Federal Circuit cases have exemplified the enablement principles 
discussed herein.  In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,68 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
a district court decision that held claims directed to a front-loading fluid injector invalid 
for lack of enablement.  On appeal, the patentee had argued that the claims had been 
interpreted too broadly, and thus, the resulting enablement inquiry had extended beyond 
the proper limits of the law.  In particular, the patentee argued that “the court erroneously 
considered whether an injector without a pressure jacket was enabled, rather than limiting 
its inquiry to whether an injector with a pressure jacket was enabled.”69  The patentee 
also sought to limit the claims to injectors with pressure jackets.  70
¶38 The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed: the court refused to adopt the proffered 
narrow construction and specifically found that the claims were “not limited to an 
injector with a pressure jacket, and therefore the full scope of the claimed inventions 
includes injectors with and without a pressure jacket.  That full scope must be enabled, 
and the district court was correct that it was not enabled.”71  In arriving at its conclusion 
that the claims lacked enablement, the court looked first to the specification, finding that 
“nowhere does the specification describe an injector with a disposable syringe without a 
pressure jacket” and in fact, finding that “the specification teaches away from such an 
invention.”72  The court gave additional weight to “testimonial evidence that such a 
system could not have been produced at the time of filing.”  In particular, the inventors 
had “admitted that they tried unsuccessfully to produce a pressure-jacketless system[,]. . . 
that producing such a system would have required more experimentation and testing” and 
that they had “decided not to pursue such a system because it was ‘too risky.’”  
Consequently, the Federal Circuit sustained the district court’s finding that the full scope 
of the claims was not enabled.  73
¶39 Notably, the Liebel court also rejected the patentee’s attempt to rely on the fact that 
the invention was in a predictable art, here, the mechanical arts, and thus, that the 
principle “that the disclosure of a single embodiment can enable a broad claim” should 
apply.  In particular, the court distinguished Spectra-Physics, stating that in Spectra, 
 
65 Id. at 1254. 
66 Id. 
67 Plant Genetic Sys. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
68 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  See also Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 
1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
69 Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1378. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1379. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1380. 
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disclosure of one attachment means permitted one skilled in the art to make and 
use the invention as broadly as it was claimed, which included other attachment 
means known to one of ordinary skill in the art.  In contrast, in this case, 
disclosure of an injector system with a pressure jacket does not permit one skilled 
in the art to make and use the invention as broadly as it was claimed, including 
without a pressure jacket.74
Thus, even though the invention at issue in Liebel was directed to fluid injectors, and thus 
squarely fit within the “mechanical arts,” such characterization did not provide any 
defense against an enablement attack where the claims were not fully enabled even in 
view of the level of knowledge in that mechanical art. 
¶40 In Monsanto Co. v. Sygenta Seeds, Inc.,75 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s summary judgment ruling that claims for a chimeric plant gene expressed in all 
plant cells are invalid due to lack of enablement.76  The ruling was based on a finding that 
the claimed invention could not be applied to a subset of flowering plants, 
monocotyledons.  The district court thus held that since “plant cells” included 
monocotyledons, any claim that extended to all plant cells was not fully enabled.  77
¶41 On appeal, the patentee argued that the term “plant cell” should not be read so 
broadly as to change “chimeric gene claims into claims directed to plants or plant cells 
transformed with the claimed gene . . . .”78  However, like the district court, the Federal 
Circuit held that the claims use broad functional language and that there was no evidence 
of a gene transformation method with monocotyledons.79  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the finding of invalidity since the claims did not bear a reasonable 
correlation to the scope of enabled subject matter.  80
¶42 Similarly, in Pharmaceutical Resources Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories Inc.,81 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a district court summary judgment ruling of invalidity for failure 
to meet the enablement requirement.  The invention claimed was a stable flocculated 
suspension of megestrol acetate with any surfactant at any concentration.  The district 
court had held that the claims were invalid because they were “extraordinarily broad” and 
that there were only three working species.82  The Federal Circuit focused its analysis on 
the “extraordinarily broad scope of the claims, which encompasses hundreds of 
surfactants, the high degree of unpredictability of the art, and the minimal guidance 
provided by the three working examples in the specification.”83  Thus, even though the 
inventors had been able to create a “stable flocculated megestrol acetate suspension” with 
seven of the surfactants specified by the claims, such a limited showing simply failed to 
 
74 Id. at 1379 (citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
75 503 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
76 Id. at 1354. 
77 Id. at 1361. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1361–62. 
81 253 F. App’x 26 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
82 Id. at 29. 
83 Id. at 31. 
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create a genuine issue of material fact regarding enablement.84  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the enablement rejection.  85
V. FINAL THOUGHTS 
¶43 So, the question remains: is it possible for one or two species to enable an entire 
genus?  The answer will, of course, depend in large part on factors over which a 
practitioner has no control, such as the state of the art and the predictability of the field.  
However, one factor that is within a practitioner’s control is the breadth of generic claims 
and the level of detail and guidance provided in the specification. 
¶44 In view of the foregoing case law, there are several measures that a practitioner can 
take to mitigate the effects of these immutables.  First, examine the relevant art with a 
critical eye.  Analyze the art not just for its novelty-destroying effect, but also for the 
level of guidance that it will provide to one of skill in the art.  If the technology is 
nascent, pay due consideration to the issues raised in Chiron and be sure that the 
application teaches any nascent technology with particularity.  Also remember that 
pioneer inventions are not entitled to a lower enablement standard.  86
¶45 Second, if broad genus claims are appropriate in view of the art, be sure also to 
draft a claim set that includes several levels of protection, such as sub-genus and species 
claims.  In other words, practitioners should describe and claim a myriad of sub-genera of 
varying scope.  Each sub-genus is defined by a set of distinct characteristics or common 
qualities.  In this way, even if a court finds the broadly drafted claims not enabled, 
secondary lines of defense will survive.  In drafting generic and sub-generic claims, try to 
identify a common quality across the genus or sub-genus that makes the genus or sub-
genus suitable for the intended purpose.  Third, it is an over-simplification to say that 
mechanical and electrical arts are predictable, whereas chemical and biotechnology arts 
are not.  Predictability or lack thereof may exist in any technology area.  Therefore, 
practitioners should be vigilant in analyzing not just the predictability in a particular 
technology area, but also in examining the predictability of what is being claimed in 




86 See Plant Genetic Sys. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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